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ABSTRACT
Rapid urbanization calls for smart traffic management solutions
that incorporate sensors, distributed traffic controllers and V2X
communication technologies to provide fine-grained traffic control
to mitigate congestion. As in many other cyber-physical systems,
smart traffic management systems typically lack security measures.
This allows numerous opportunities for adversarial entities to craft
attacks on the sensor networks, wireless data sharing and/or the
distributed traffic controllers. We show that such vulnerabilities
can be exploited to disrupt mobility in a large urban area and cause
unsafe conditions for drivers and the pedestrians on the roads.
Specifically, in this paper, we look into vulnerabilities in model-
based traffic controllers and show that, even with state-of-the-art
attack detectors in place, false-data injection can be used to hamper
mobility. We demonstrate a replay attack by modeling an isolated
intersection in VISSIM, a popular traffic simulator and also discuss
countermeasures to thwart such attacks.
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1 INTRODUCTION
More people are moving into urban areas for better economic and
social prospects [26]. This is accompanied by increasing demands
on urban transportation infrastructure which is typically at capacity
and often cannot cope with this surge in demand. As a result, city-
dwellers often face traffic congestion. On an average, commuters
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face about 42 hours of delays in a year due to traffic congestion [2].
Such delays cause wasted time, negative impacts to the socioeco-
nomic growth of the area, increased pollution and fuel expenses [9].
Smart cities provide a promising framework to tackle issues per-
taining to urban resources [28]. Many traffic control strategies have
been proposed that rely on sensors, on-road detectors, cameras
and/or other road-side units (RSUs) to measure real-time traffic
flow characteristics such as queue lengths, vehicle speeds, traffic
density, etc [27]. The measured data is then communicated to a
traffic controller that adaptively manages the traffic flow as per the
deployed control strategy [23, 30]. However, most of these tech-
niques are deployed on top of the legacy traffic infrastructure [3]
which was built without security in mind. This makes the intelligent
traffic management system, like many other cyber-physical sys-
tems, vulnerable to attacks [11, 15]. Adversarial entities can exploit
the weaknesses of these systems using, for example, replay attacks
(i.e., provide controllers with spurious sensing information [6]) or
disrupt measurements and communications (i.e., denial-of-service
(DoS) attacks [16]) to cause phantom traffic jams or otherwise de-
grade the quality of (transportation) service [18].
Model-based traffic control approaches have been fairly pop-
ular in estimating traffic queues and controlling the traffic flow.
Traditional approaches such as UTOPIA [19], PRODYN [13], and
RHODES [20], etc., as well as newly developed MPC-based traf-
fic control algorithms [17] rely on traffic models and state-space
estimations to predict traffic flow and hence establish a finer con-
trol over the traffic. Such model-based controllers not only provide
real-time traffic control from received information about vehicle
density and speed but also provide self-adaptive control strategy
that combines current measurements as well as future estimations
of the traffic characteristics [7, 30]. Since such systems still rely on
measurements from insecure sensors, they need to accompanied
with attack detectors that monitor the estimates made by the model.
These detectors can detect malicious activities if the decisions do
not corroborate the observations [25]. Our key contributions are:
• We propose a replay attack, which is a subset of false-data
injection attacks, on the inductive loop detector used in
transportation systems to estimate vehicle flow.
• We explore the shortcomings of the existing model-based
attack detectors.
• We provide a threshold-based countermeasure and validate
its performance with VISSIM, a real-world traffic simulator.
In this work, we discuss the system model as a four-way traffic
intersection and provide a state-space model in Sec. 2. Then, in
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Sec. 3 we design a replay attack on the inductive loop detectors. We
demonstrate the shortcoming of model-based detectors in detecting
our attack in Sec. 4.1. We propose a threshold-based approach as a
countermeasure in Sec. 4.2 and then conclude in Sec. 5.
2 SYSTEM MODEL
This section delves into the traffic parameters and state-space mod-
els to mimic a four-way intersection traffic controller.
2.1 Traffic, Intersection and Infrastructure
Most traffic controllers in the U.S. deploy inductive loop detectors
to collect traffic-related information [12]. Occupancy sensor read-
ings obtained from these inductive loop detectors are then used to
establish control over the traffic lights [1]. In this paper, we con-
sider an isolated four-way intersection as shown in Fig. 1a. Traffic
lights are situated at the end of all four lanes downstream and
are controlled using our model-based traffic controller. This traffic
controller acquires real-time measurements from inductive loop
detectors located upstream. For simplicity, we consider that the
vehicles use the intersection only to go straight (no left/right turns).
Adding turning lanes and vehicles simply requires extending the
system model with multiple traffic lights. Incoming traffic within
each lane has the following characteristics:
• Intensity (It )[v/h]: Average rate of vehicles entering a given
lane at a time instant t .
• Saturation Flow (S)[v/h]: The maximum number of vehicles
per hour that can flow through the intersection depending
on the lane capacity.
• Green Light Duration (z)[s]: The time for which the vehicles
from a lane can access the intersection.
The traffic controller decides the green-yellow-red timing sched-
ule for the traffic lights located at the intersection. The controller
follows a cycle time (Tc [s]) that defines the time window within
which each traffic light turns green at least once. At the beginning
of each Tc , the controller decides the schedule for the next cycle
window as per the control algorithm and the process repeats at the
end of the cycle.
A vehicle entering the lane activates the inductive loop installed
on the road that generates a signal variation whose duration de-
pends on how long a vehicle stays over the detector. The amount of
time the detector remains activated within a given sample period
determines the occupancy rate (O[%]) of the sensor. When a vehicle
passes over the detector at high speed, the occupancy rate reported
would be a lower value since the vehicles spend less time over the
detector. This value increases as the speed of the passing vehicle
decreases, and eventually saturates at 100% when the vehicle is
stationary on top of the detector.
While multiple loop detectors may be located on the road to
measure different traffic characteristics, in practice, only the one
located farthest from the intersection is used to measure the flow of
the traffic as it has the least probability of saturation [8]. Therefore,
our trafficmodel considers the loop detectors situated at the farthest
end of our incoming lanes, as shown in Fig. 1a for traffic estimation.
Our model is communication-agnostic and the measurements may
be reported using Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC),
CV2X, etc., while assuming that the communication channel is
secure. We now provide a state-space model that closely represents
our adaptive traffic control system.
2.2 Model-based Self-Adaptive Traffic
Controller
Among the various application-specific models that have been de-
veloped to analyze traffic characteristics, the model presented in [4]
provides a state-space model to estimate the parameters of the traf-
fic model based off inductive loop measurements [30]. We use the
model in [4] to adjust the green light duration at the intersection.
Traffic control within each lanes of an intersection can be char-
acterized by estimating the development of vehicle queues in each
lane over time. By utilizing the occupancy rate measurements pro-
vided by the sensors (also known as the measurable quantities)
the states of the system (Xt ) at a given time instant t need to be
formulated to describe how the queues evolve with the measure-
ments and the control decisions for the green light. The state-space
equations are defined as
Xt = [Qt ,Ot ]T , (1)
where Qt is the current estimated queue length in a given lane and
Ot is the occupancy of the inductive loop detector at time t .
Similarly, yt defines the observable quantities in the system that
influence the evolution of the queues in all lanes and is given by
yt = [Yt ,Ot ]T , (2)
where Yt is the number of vehicles being dispatched within a given
time window of Tc due to the controlled green light.
The queue lengthwithin each lane also depends on the saturation
flow of the lane. Saturation flow (S [veh/h]), as explained earlier,
provides the maximum number of vehicles that can enter into the
lane due to the physical capacity of the lanes and intersection.
Hence, to relate the queue development with the saturation flow,
a parameter δ is introduced. δ is set to zero when the incoming
vehicle flow is less than the saturation flow and is set to unity,
otherwise. The value of δ is updated at the start of each traffic
cycle window and ensures that the incoming flow never exceeds
the saturation flow.
The objective of the controller is to collectively minimize the
vehicle queues in each incoming lane of our intersection. Eq. 3
describes how queue lengths can be estimated from current queues
in the system as well as the current sensor measurements
Qt+1 = δt Qt − [δt S + (1 − δt ) It ] zt + It , (3a)
Ot+1 = ktQt + βt Ot + λt , (3b)
where λ, k and β are environment-dependent parameters that de-
scribe the traffic flow within each lane and have to be estimated
real-time as the traffic flow intensity changes. Here, we estimate
the values of λ, k and β using our traffic flow simulator, VISSIM [5]
by fitting a linear regression model to each arm of the intersection,
as shown in Fig. 1b and c.
The observable variables of the system such as the vehicles being
dispatched at each green light and the occupancy rate measure-
ments are given by Eq. 4 as
Yt+1 = ∆Qt+1 + It , (4a)
Ot+1 = Ot+1. (4b)
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Figure 1: (a) A typical smart trafficmanagement system for an isolated four-way intersection, (b) VISSIM queue simulation, (c)
Linear regression model to estimate λ, k and β using queue formation from VISSIM simulation, (d) Observables of the system
with/without attack, Occupancy and Queue Length (the value of the scaling parameter f is set to 0.7 in this graph).
And finally, the control law for updating the green lights with
changing occupancy rate measurements is
zt+1 = zt (1 + f × ∆O) , (5)
where, the green light time, zt+1 for the next traffic cycle depends
on the current green light time zt and the change in occupancy rate
measurements within the last traffic cycle. With a constant traffic
flow, the green light timing settles to a value at which the occupancy
rates do not change and the queues developed are constant. The
parameter f is a scaling factor determined experimentally.
Since turning vehicles are disregarded in our model, even though
there are four incoming flows into the intersection, every flow has a
complementing non-conflicting flow. That is, when the traffic lights
turn green, vehicles from two lanes can access the intersection at
once without causing collisions. Thus, the controller can calculate
the green times as per the maximum flow intensity of the two non-
conflicting flows. This will ensure that the flow with less intensity
will also be served properly if the timings are decided as per the
dominant flow [10]. Hence, the traffic lights of the non-conflicting
flows can be paired and controlled at once to improve the efficiency
of the system. Thus, our traffic controller for a four-way intersection
controls the timing schedule for four traffic lights or two traffic
light pairs within a cycle window Tc .
The equations described above can be extended for a four-way
intersection traffic controller with two traffic light pairs. To ensure
the robustness of our model, measurement noise (ν ) and process
noise (p) are added. The complete systemmodel equations are given
below. This traffic controller model is then implemented on MAT-
LAB with VISSIM simulation-in-loop to verify its performance. A
short video of VISSIM simulation with the adaptive traffic controller
is available [24].
Q1,t+1
Q2,t+1
O1,t+1
O2,t+1
 = A ×

Q1,t+1
Q2,t+1
O1,t+1
O2,t+1
 + B ×
[
z1,t
z2,t
]
+ F + pt , (6)

Y1,t+1
Y2,t+1
O1,t+1
O2,t+1
 = C ×

Q1,t+1
Q2,t+1
O1,t+1
O2,t+1
 + H + νt+1, (7)
where
A =

δ1,t 0 0 0
0 δ2,t 0 0
k1,t 0 β1,t 0
0 k2,t 0 β2,t
 ,
B =

−δS1,t /dt − (1 − δ )I1,t /dt 0
0 −δS2,t /dt − (1 − δ )I2,t /dt
0 0
0 0
 ,
F =

I1,tdt
I2,tdt
λ1
λ2
 ,C =

0 −α 0 0
α 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1
 ,H = −C ×

Q1,t + I1,tdt
Q2,t + I2,tdt
0
0
 ,
where dt shows the simulation step time.[
Z1,t+1
Z2,t+1
]
=
[
Z1,t
Z2,t
]
×
(
1 + f ×
[
∆O1
∆O2
] )
;Z1,t+1 + Z2,t+1 <= Tc .
(8)
In Eq. 7, α represents the ratio of left turning vehicles in a given
incoming traffic stream. To extend the model for turning lanes, α
values can be found through various data collection points and
traffic flow estimations. For simplicity, we set α to zero.
3 THREAT MODEL AND ATTACK STRATEGY
In a typical CPS, adversaries can attack either the analog stimulus
that excites the sensor, the analog output of the sensors or the digital
output of the sensor system that is fed into the control system. This
paper focuses on the digital output of the inductive loop detector
as a possible foothold for a replay attack.
3.1 Attack Goal and Assumptions
Traffic congestion can have network level effects and a large-scale
impact on the safety of everyone involved. The attacker’s objective
is maximizing the queue length to eventually disrupt the trans-
portation network. Hence, our attacker’s goal is to decrease the
efficiency of traffic lights by manipulating the traffic controller.
Since we focus on an isolated traffic intersection, this paper
assumes that the traffic has not been affected by prior events such as
impending queues, traffic congestion etc. Also, the vehicles arrival
pattern in each lane is modeled by Poisson distribution [22] where
the length of each vehicle is the same. All vehicles are assumed to
follow the rules of the traffic light.
The attacker has the ability to view and affect the perceived
occupancy rate. Once the occupancy sensors perform the measure-
ments, the attacker is able to record the output of the sensor and
sending it later at an opportune moment. The attacker may do
so by attaching an additional off-the-shelf microcontroller to read
the sensor values and/or an inexpensive transmitter antenna to
send out the falsified data, which summarizes our replay attack.
Additionally, the attacker has sufficient resources to monitor the
system (intersection). They are also able to wait until the proper
conditions, from their perspective, are present for the attack to take
place. Critically, the attacker does not have the ability to tamper
with the sensor data and can only replay the existing data.
3.2 Attack Strategy
Since the control law for the traffic lights relies on the difference in
occupancy rate measurements, a negative occupancy rate difference
would mean reduction in traffic and would require reduction in
the green light time allocation. Hence, the attacker can constantly
capture the sensor data by monitoring the system and induce an
attack by replaying a low occupancy measurement in place of the
actual reported. By judiciously choosing the right data to send, the
attacker can constantly introduce negative difference in occupancy
rate measurement and disrupt the lights by eventually bringing the
green light time to zero. In the state space model, we target the
Algorithm 1 Replay attack
1: z: green light duration
2: O : occupancy of the inductive loop detector
3: f : environment dependent parameter
4: ras: replay attack signal
5: procedure replay attack (Ot , zt , f )
6: ras ← Inf
7: for each t in TC do
8: if Ot −Ot−1 < ras −Ot−1 then
9: ras ← Ot ▷ ras: the smallest value of the sensor
over time
10: zt ← zt−1 (1 + f (ras −Ot−1))
11: else
12: zt ← zt−1 (1 + f (Ot −Ot−1))
green light control law given at Eq. 4 to craft a replay attack. This
attack is performed by changing the green light equation as,
zt+1 = zt (1 + f (ras −Ot )) , (9)
where "ras" is the replay attack signal, which holds the smallest
value of O up until the current time instant, and gets updated if
Ot+1 − Ot < ras − Ot . This is summarized in Alg. 1. Eventually
this drives the green light allocation to be less that sufficient and
creates a long queue in at least one arm.
The effect of the attack on a detector placed in one of the lanes
in the system is given in Fig. 1d in terms of occupancy and queue
length with 700 v/h intensity as the dominant traffic flow when the
attack is launched at 420 seconds. It is clear that when the system
is under attack, the occupancy difference injected by the attacker
makes the green light allocation smaller. Due to this, the queue
length increases drastically, the occupancy sensors saturate and
thus, disrupt the traffic network.
We next evaluate the performance of our attack in presence of
the state-of-the-art attack detectors.
4 COUNTERMEASURES
Algorithm 2 Threshold-based attack detection
1: z: green light duration
2: I : intensity of flow of vehicles into an intersection
3: O : occupancy of strategic loop detector
4: thrsh: offline value defined on the queue length in each arm
5: ζ : scaling factor
6: procedure Define an offline threshold (Ot , zt )
7: thrsh ← −∞
8: for each t in TC do
9: if (Ot −Ot−1) > thrsh then
10: thrsh ← avg{thrsh,Ot }
11: procedure counter measure (Ot , zt , f ,It )
12: for each dt in TC do
13: if (Ot −Ot−1) < thrsh then
14: attack detected
15: ζ ← Tc∑
arm I
16: zt ← zt−1 (ζ × It )
17: else
18: zt ← zt−1 (1 + f × ∆O)
19: update offline threshold
In this section, by using an approximate model for estimating the
occupancy previously presented in Sec. 2, we show that the state-
of-the-art model-based detectors fail to detect our replay attack,
and then we provide countermeasures to modify such detectors.
4.1 Model-based attack detectors
In practice, an attack detector is based off an approximate model of
the system, as it must closely represent the system without relying
on having an exact knowledge of it. The model given in Eq. 10
and Eq. 11 holds the occupancy values as the main observable in
the system. The simplicity of the model, and the fact that these
occupancy measurements are the main foothold for the attacker,
makes the approximate model a better candidate for our analysis
hereafter. The state space equations of the approximate model are[
O1,t+1
O2,t+1
]
= A′ ×
[
O1,t
O2,t
]
+ B′ (dt ) ×
[
u1,t
u2,t
]
+
[
p1,t
p2,t
]
, (10)
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Figure 2: The performance of the state-of-the-art model-based detector [25] under different measurement noise power values.
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Figure 3: Setting a threshold to detect an attack using the
occupancy sensor values.
[
O1,t+1
O2,t+1
]
= C′ ×
[
O1,t
O2,t
]
+ D′ (dt ) ×
[
u1,t
u2,t
]
+
[
ν1,t
ν2,t
]
, (11)
where
A′ =
[
1 0
0 1
]
,B′ =
[
3 0
0 3
]
,C ′ =
[
2.5 0
0 2.5
]
,D ′ = D,
and u shows the input approximation as per vehicles entering and
leaving and ut+1 is given as
ut+1 = i × dt − S × zt+1. (12)
Next, we explore the existing methods for detecting our replay
attack on the approximate model. Model-based attack detectors
are extensively covered in the state-of-the-art as strong candidates
for detection of false-data injection in control systems [25]. Here
we demonstrate shortcomings of the model-based approach by
Pasqualetti et al. [25] in detecting our replay attack, and then pro-
vide our threshold-based countermeasure which successfully de-
tects malicious activities when our attack is in progress. Our results
are then validated through VISSIM.
Model-based attack (anomaly) detectors for CPS are those that
make an estimate of how the system should be observed to evolve
and compare it with themeasured value of the state (how the system
actually evolves), shown by r (t) at Eq. 13. In absence of an attacker
r (t) should be close to zero. Pasqualetti et al [25] propose a monitor
ω (t) for this purpose which is defined as
E Ûω (t) = (A′ +GC ′) ω (t) −G y (t) ,
r (t) = C ′ω (t) − y (t) , (13)
where E = 1 in our approximate model, ω (0) = x (0), and G is the
output injection matrix which should be selected so that the pair
(E,A′ +GC ′) is regular and Hurwitz [14].
Fig. 2 illustrates the robustness of the Pasqualetti’s detector to
the measurement noise power when our attack is taking place. With
low measurement and process noise, an abrupt change will appear
in the error calculations which makes it possible to perform anom-
aly based attack detection shown in Fig. 2a. As the measurement
noise power increases while the estimation noise is kept consistent,
the performance of Pasqualetti’s detector degrades (Fig. 2b) and
eventually breaks (Fig. 2c). This shows that our replay attack is not
detectable by the model-based detector of the state-of-the-art if
noise power exceeds 0.394% of the original signal power.
4.2 Threshold-based attack detectors
Having shown the shortcomings of the model-based attack detec-
tors to detect our replay attack, we now introduce a countermeasure
in this section. The conventional andmost common countermeasure
against false-data injection attacks on control systems is Kalman
Filter (KF) estimation of the states of the system followed by a
simple comparison [4, 21]. Even though KF has high accuracy of
estimation over the other available filters, it is designed on the basis
of the not necessarily correct assumption that the parameters are
Gaussian distributed in a linear system. Other filters such as particle
filtering [29] overcome this shortcoming by addressing the general
non-Gaussian non-linear systems at the cost of higher complexity.
To avoid the complexity-performance trade-off, a general solution
to this problem could be using the timestamps of the inductive
loop detector output. However, this method depends on another
sensor output and there is no guarantee that it is secure. Also, a
sophisticated attacker can forge time-stamps by crafting a more
complicated attack than a replay attack.
We address these shortcomings by proposing a threshold based
countermeasure described in detail in Alg. 2. The threshold is de-
fined in an offline training process to distinguish between benign
and malicious activities by looking into the changes in the occu-
pancy sensors readings in two consecutive time instants (given
by ∆O). In this case, we adjust the threshold in a way that it de-
tects the abrupt change generated in the reported ∆O when there
are ongoing malicious activities. Anytime the change in ∆O goes
above this threshold an attack is said to be detected. This threshold
changes overtime, and needs to be updated using secure data. Note
that upon detection of an attack the green light values get updated
by a new control law
zt = zt−1 (ζ × It ) , (14)
where ζ is a normalizing factor given by ζ = Tc∑
arm I
, such that the
green time is proportionally distributed as per the incoming traffic
flow rate, while assuming the It measurement is secure.
Fig. 3 shows the change of occupancy over time for one arm
with/without attack, where the threshold is defined to create sepa-
rability between the spike in the graph caused by the attack versus
the case with no attack.
4.3 Time Complexity
The threshold-based detection mechanism is provided in Alg. 2,
where the training of threshold is performed offline and hence
does not add to the time complexity of the approach. The detection
mechanism however, includes a comparison operationwhich results
in time complexity of O (n).
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first introduce a replay attack on the inductive loop
sensors which are used for traffic control in an isolated four-way
intersection. More specifically, the occupancy sensor measurements
are used as a feedback to adjust the green light timings for the traffic
lights. By introducing a replay attack, a type of false-data injection
attack, our attacker minimizes the efficiency of the traffic controller
by affecting the green light allocation and thereby maximizing
the queue lengths in at least one of the lanes of the intersection.
By showing that the existing model-based attack detectors fail in
detecting our attack, we put forth an alternative threshold-based
detection algorithm. This detector observes the occupancy sensor
data over time and raises a flag if the changes in the occupancy
sensor measurements are above an offline defined threshold. As-
sessment of the current threshold-based detector under a smarter
attacker capable of evasion attacks is the future direction of our
work. We are also interested in extending this study to analyse the
feasibility of our approach for broader ranges of traffic models that
rely on occupancy sensor measurements.
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